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Abstract
Although the literature on party ambiguity does not lead to a consensus, recent find-
ings suggest that party ambiguity is a good strategy for electoral success. However,
the literature on decision processes shows that individuals generally dislike ambiguity.
The aim of the present project is to test the effect of party ambiguity on party prefer-
ences at the individual level, to see if findings in decision processes still apply. Using
election data from eight Western European democracies, I define a measure of party
ambiguity at the individual level and find that ambiguity has a negative effect on party
preferences. In addition, I find that individuals with a high interest in politics are less
likely to like ambiguous parties.
Word Count: 5285
Declarations of interest: None
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1 Introduction
Ambiguity is a strategy used by parties to avoid taking a clear position on an issue. Parties
can be ambiguous in different ways. For example, they can avoid discussing an issue or they
can send different signals to different groups of voters concerning their position on an issue.
Regardless of how it is generated, party ambiguity leads to a low consensus among voters
concerning where the party stands ideologically. In other words, the estimation by voters of
a party’s location on an ideological dimension has a large variance if the party is ambiguous
on that dimension.
Investigating the effect of party ambiguity on individual preferences is important for sev-
eral reasons. First, ambiguity increases confusion and hinders voters from clarifying their
options. This can hamper the democratic process. Second, ambiguity may lead voters to
focus on non-ideological dimensions (Alvarez, 1998; Dalton, 2008), which may also compro-
mise democratic representation. Third, ambiguity may camouflage responsibility. Clarity
of responsibility is important for the agent-principal relationship between voters and parties
to work correctly. To summarize, party ambiguity can lead to higher uncertainty of party
positions, higher importance of non-ideological issues, and lower clarity of responsibility.
Ambiguity can thus weaken democratic representation. Consequently, it is important to
understand whether party ambiguity has a cost or not. The aim of this paper is to test
whether voters dislike party ambiguity, and to investigate which voters are more inclined to
tolerate ambiguity.
Early work on decision theory shows that the majority of individuals are risk averse, and
generally prefer outcomes with low uncertainty. However, in the literature on party ambi-
guity, no consensus exists concerning the effect of party ambiguity on vote share, and recent
empirical results (Bra¨uninger and Giger, 2016; Somer-Topcu, 2015; Tomz and Van Houwel-
ing, 2009) suggest that ambiguity increases vote share. I argue that the contradictory results
might come from the fact that work on decision processes focuses on individual behavior,
whereas work on party ambiguity mainly uses party-level analyses.
In this paper, I propose a measure of party ambiguity for each voter-party dyad to test
the effect of ambiguity on party preferences. My measure has two advantages. First, it takes
into account various dimensions. This is particularly important when studying ambiguity,
as political parties can be more vague on some issues and less on others (De Vries and
Hobolt, 2012; Rovny, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). Second, as projection effect can affect
the measure of ambiguity, I use a sampling method to attenuate this endogeneity problem
between party preferences and the measure of ambiguity. I use electoral surveys in eight
multi-party systems and find that ambiguity has a negative effect on party preferences. I also
find a negative effect of party ambiguity on the perceived distance, consistent with Somer-
Topcu (2015). However, despite this potential benefit for ambiguous parties, the results
show a strong direct negative effect of party ambiguity on voters’ preferences, suggesting
that ambiguity has a cost. In an additional analysis, I show that voters with high political
interest are less likely to tolerate ambiguity. In the next section I discuss the relationship
between party ambiguity and individual preferences. In section 3, I present my measure
of ambiguity. The results of the main analysis are presented in section 4. The effect of
ambiguity on the perceived distance is investigated in section 5. Section 6 presents the
additional analysis on the effect of political interest and section 7 consists of a discussion.
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2 Ambiguity and Party Preferences
2.1 Ambiguity and Decision Processes
Early work on decision processes suggests that individuals generally dislike ambiguity. Ells-
berg (1961) shows with an urn experiment that individuals prefer a choice for which they
know the probability of winning and losing than a choice with unknown odds (see also
Fellner, 1961). Work on risk attitudes also shows that most of the people are risk averse
and thus try to avoid uncertain outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Quattrone and
Tversky, 1988; Weber, 1999; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner, 2011).
Consequently, the literature studying decision processes suggests that individuals rather dis-
like ambiguity.
2.2 Ambiguity and Parties
An important part of the literature on party ambiguity tests whether ambiguity is a good
strategy for electoral success. Most of the work on the effect of ambiguity focuses on the
US case: empirical studies use data on presidential elections, and theoretical studies assume
a two-candidates race. However, several recent studies also investigate party ambiguity in
multiparty systems (Bra¨uninger and Giger, 2016; Rovny, 2012; Somer-Topcu, 2015).
In theoretical studies, there is no clear consensus concerning the effect of party ambiguity
on electoral success. In his book, Downs (1957) argues that the effect of ambiguity should
vary according to the party system. He explains that “each party in a multiparty system
will try to differentiate its product sharply from the products of all other parties”, and
that “political rationality leads parties in a two-party system to becloud their policies in
a fog of ambiguity.”(p. 134-136) According to Page (1976) who discusses ambiguity in the
US, “the candidate’s best strategy is to avoid issues of a divisive sort, and place (as nearly
as possible) no emphasis on them, but devote all his time, money, and energy to matters
of consensus.”(p. 749) In a theoretical paper, Shepsle (1972) uses formal theory to show
that in majority systems, ambiguity decreases the appeal of candidates unless a majority
of the voters is risk acceptant. Glazer (1990) shows that ambiguity can be a good strategy
in two-party majority systems if the candidates are uncertain about voters’ preferences.
Other results based on formal models also aim at explaining the incentives for parties to be
ambiguous (Alesina and Cukierman, 1990; Aragones and Neeman, 2000).
In empirical studies, the results are also mixed. Bartels (1986) assumes that voters are
risk averse and presents an empirical analysis showing that voters tend to dislike uncertainty.
Gill (2005) finds that candidates have no incentive to be unclear about their preferences,
unless they have extreme ones. Campbell (1983) finds that ambiguity has a positive effect
if proximity to voters is low. In more recent studies, ambiguity seems to be a winning
strategy for parties. Tomz and Van Houweling (2009) use experimental data and show that
ambiguity attracts voters. Somer-Topcu (2015) finds that party ambiguity is a winning
strategy. She shows that party ambiguity decreases the perceived distance between voters
and the party. Bra¨uninger and Giger (2016) find that ambiguity can be a good strategy to
appeal to the general public and parties’ core constituencies. There are also more specific
results concerning the effect of party ambiguity on electoral success. For example, Hersh
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and Schaffner (2013) find that targeting differently different groups of voters can penalize
the party and that broad-appeal is generally a better strategy. Finally, Rovny (2012) finds
that parties in multiparty systems tend to blur their stances on dimensions on which they
are moderate.
To summarize, empirical findings in the literature in decision theory show that individuals
dislike ambiguity, whereas empirical findings in the literature on political parties do not
lead to a consensus concerning the effect of ambiguity. Especially, several recent findings
(Bra¨uninger and Giger, 2016; Somer-Topcu, 2015; Tomz and Van Houweling, 2009) suggest
that ambiguity is a winning strategy for parties. The difference in results may be due to the
fact that work on decision processes focuses on individuals, while the units of observations
in the research on party ambiguity are generally the parties. One exception is the paper by
Tomz and Van Houweling (2009) that shows that ambiguity attracts voters. The authors
use an experimental design that mimics the US system.
Existing studies on the effect of party ambiguity in multiparty systems are based on
aggregate electoral results and consequently, cannot directly test the effect of ambiguity on
individual preferences. The aim of the present paper is to use survey data from eight coun-
tries in Europe to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : The more a party represents an ambiguous option for a voter, the less likely
the voter is to like this party, ceteris paribus.
In an additional analysis, I try to understand whether some voters are more attracted to
ambiguous parties than others. More specifically, I test whether interest in politics affects
the effect of ambiguity on party sympathy. Research in psychology has shown that one of
the main motivational factors for curiosity and information seeking is to reduce uncertainty
(see for example Berlyne, 1966; Kidd and Hayden, 2015). This suggests that individuals
with high interest in politics have higher aversion for uncertainty. I thus expect voters with
high interest in politics to be less tolerant towards ambiguity:
hypothesis 2 : Ambiguity has a greater negative effect on party sympathy among individuals
with high levels of political interest, ceteris paribus.
I use a spatial representation of policy preferences to deduce a measure of ambiguity for
each voter-party dyad and test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. This measure estimates the
extent to which a party represents an ambiguous option for a voter. In the next section, I
explain the operationalization of my measure of ambiguity.
3 Estimating the Policy Space and Measuring Ambi-
guity
In the literature on decision under uncertainty, several scholars depart from the expected
utility hypothesis (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Their main
argument is that individuals do not only consider the expected utility specific to each option
4
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before making a decision, but they consider the distribution of the utility specific to each
option. In particular, the variance of the utility of an option matters.
From a voter’s standpoint, each party is an option. As party ambiguity increases, the
uncertainty of the option increases too. I will thus estimate how ambiguous each option
looks to each voter. I use a spatial model because it condenses the ideological distances
between parties and voters on several issues into one utility (i.e. the distance) for each
voter-party dyad. To estimate ambiguity, I will then measure how this utility can vary due
to party ambiguity. In spatial voting models, the options are the parties, and the utility of
each option is generally quantified by −d, i.e. minus the Euclidean distance to each party
(Black, 1978; Downs, 1957; Hotelling, 1929). The higher the variation of −dvp, the more
ambiguous the option p is for voter v. Consequently, I define ambiguity at the voter-party
dyad level as the standard deviation of the distance between a voter and a party.
To estimate ambiguity, I proceed in two steps. First, I locate voters and parties on the
same two-dimensional policy space. For each party, I obtain a distribution of perceived
locations (i.e. locations perceived by the different voters). Second, given voters’ locations
and the distributions of parties’ locations, I estimate the standard deviation of the distance
for each voter-party dyad.
3.1 Policy Space: Voters and Parties
I use the most recent election studies in several European countries where all variables
necessary for my analysis are available. The surveys come from the electoral studies of
Austria 2013, Belgium 1995, Denmark 2011, Germany 2013, Ireland 2002, the Netherlands
2012, Switzerland 2007, and the United Kingdom 2010. The number of cases is limited
by data availability mainly because most of the election surveys do not ask respondents to
locate themselves and parties on at least three policy dimensions.
To estimate the policy space, I use self-locations of respondents on three or more policy
issues (depending on the country, see the Appendix for more details). In each country
separately, I run a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) using respondents’ self-locations
on the various issues.1 This allows me to define in each country a two-dimensional policy
space.2 As respondents have also located the main political parties on the same issues,
I use the loadings of the PCA to define where each respondent places each party on the
two-dimensional policy space.3 This gives a cloud of points for voters, and one for each
party.
As an example, Figure 1 shows the locations of voters in grey and the mean locations of
parties in Denmark on a two-dimensional space. For each party, the variance of the perceived
party locations is described by an 80% confidence ellipse for each party (assuming a Normal
distribution). These two-dimensional measures of variance describe the level of consensus
1As the data are not continuous, one drawback here is that the matrix of variance-covariance estimated
for the PCA is biased.
2I keep the two dimensions with the highest eigenvalues, because they generally explain most of the
variability.
3The reason for not including all locations (parties and respondents) for the estimation of the PCA is
that party locations are more numerous than self-locations, and using all locations might distort the policy
space.
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across voters concerning where each party stands (also called disagreement in the literature).
Figure 1: Policy Space in Denmark
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lib = Liberals
lwa = Leftwing Alliance
It is interesting to note that in several countries (not in Denmark), some parties are
more ambiguous on the first dimension, while others are more ambiguous on the second
dimension. Having a distribution for each party location in two dimensions, I can now
estimate ambiguity.
3.2 Ambiguity
High ambiguity leads to low consensus among voters concerning where the party stands
ideologically. Consequently, party ambiguity can be conceptualized by the deviation of
its location as given by the voters. This is ambiguity at the party level. However, for a
given voter, what matters is the dispersion of the potential outcome. More specifically,
what matters to the voter is the extent to which party ambiguity can affect the ideological
distance between himself and the party. I thus define ambiguity as the standard deviation
of the distance between the location of the voter and the locations of the party as perceived
by all respondents.
In a two-dimensional space, the distance d between a voter v and a party p can be written
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as follows:
dvp = dist((xv, yv); (xp, yp)) ,
with dist(; ) the Euclidean distance between two points, (xv, yv) the location of a voter v in
a two-diensional space, and (xp, yp) the location of a party p on the same space. If the party
has an ambiguous location, (xp, yp) are random variables. Consequently, dvp will also be a
random variable and the ambiguity is:4
ambiguityvp = sd(dvp) .
The left graph of Figure 2 shows the perceived party locations of an (imaginary) party
with mean (3; 3), and a voter V located at (8; 4), on a two-dimensional policy space. As party
ambiguity is not null here, the party locations perceived by the voters are a distribution of
points around (3; 3). The grey segments in the right graph of Figure 2 show the distance
between voter V and each point of the distribution. Ambiguity is the standard deviation of
the length of these grey segments.
Figure 2: party locations and fi(di)
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The underlying assumption of this measure is that individuals have an idea of how am-
4As van der Eijk (2001) suggests, measures of deviations on one dimension are potentially biased if the
scale is defined by a fixed number of categories. However, as no measure of centrality is directly related to his
measure of agreement, I cannot measure agreement before applying the PCA and then transform it using the
loadings of the PCA. After the application of the PCA, as the two main dimensions are a linear combination
of several issues, the resulting categories are not equally spaced, and consequently, the interval assumption
does not hold. Consequently, his measure of agreement cannot be deduced from the two dimensions given
by the PCA. However, as a linear combination of several issues gives rise to a higher number of categories,
the bias identified by van der Eijk (2001) should be of lesser importance.
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biguous parties are on the main policy issues. If there is full consensus among voters con-
cerning where the party stands, a voter will be able to know that the distance between him
and the party is certain and thus, ambiguity will be null. If there is high disagreement among
voters concerning where a party stands, a voter will know that the distance between him
and the party is ambiguous. This is a strong assumption, however, if parties stay vague on
an issue, send different signals to different groups of voters, or send various signals to the
voters over time, the voters should be able to perceive this.
The advantage of using a spatial model, based on several issues, is twofold. First it
estimates the ideological distance between a voter and a party. In other words, it summarizes
a voter’s preferences relative to a party into one utility, the distance. Second, estimating
how this distance can vary due to party ambiguity summarizes into one measure how party
ambiguity affects a voter. If a party is ambiguous on two related issues, or if a party is
ambiguous on two orthogonal issues should have different consequences for voters and using
a spatial model enables to take this into account.
Finally, ambiguity depends on the voter’s location relative to the party. In two dimen-
sions, as parties can be more ambiguous on some issues and less on others, the ambiguity
of a party can matter more or less depending on the location of the voter. To understand
the relation between party ambiguity and ambiguity, Figure 3 displays one party (party A)
and two voters (voter 1 and voter 2) on a two-dimensional policy space. The ellipse is the
95 percent confidence ellipse of the distribution of party A’s locations as perceived by the
voters.
Figure 3: Ambiguity
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The distance to the party is the same for both voters. However, as party A is more ambiguous
on dimension 1 than on dimension 2, the ambiguity of party A will affect the estimation of
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the distance to the party much more for voter 2 than for voter 1,5 and therefore sd(d1A) <
sd(d2A). Consequently, the ambiguity of a party might render the distance d to the party
much more uncertain for some voters than for others depending on their location relative to
the party’s location, and ambiguity takes this feature into account.
I will thus estimate ambiguity based on the spatial locations of voters and parties. How-
ever, I will not use all perceived party locations. I use a sampling procedure to avoid potential
endogeneity problems. Using the whole sample might lead to biased estimations of ambigu-
ity and this for several reasons First, for some respondents, placing parties on a scale is not
intuitive. For example, some invert the left and the right. Taking their party location might
bias the results. I thus follow common practice and remove the perceived party locations of
these respondents for the estimation of party ambiguity.
Second, the supporters of some parties have higher levels of political information than the
supporters of other parties. This might also bias the estimation of party ambiguity, as these
informed voters are more likely to know the locations of all parties while the other voters are
more likely to know the location of their preferred party only. Thus, I will select a sample of
the respondents. The sample will force a similar distribution of political knowledge for the
supporters of each party.
Third, and more importantly, projection effect might bias the estimation of ambiguity.
Indeed, projection effect is the process by which a voter underestimates the distance between
himself and the party when he likes the party. If the supporters of a party are highly dispersed
(and are numerous), projection effect will lead to an overestimation of the ambiguity of this
party. Conversely, if the supporters of a party are very similar (and are numerous), projection
effect can lead to an underestimation of the ambiguity of this party. In other words, we have
to differentiate between the dispersion of the supporters of a party and the ambiguity of the
party. Because the more successful the party is, the higher the potential bias, there is a
slight endogeneity problem as I test the effect of ambiguity on party preferences. Typically,
a catch-all party will have a large amount of supporters and these supporters are likely to
be highly dispersed. The ambiguity of this party can be overestimated here because these
supporters will locate their favourite party close to them due to projection effect.
For the distribution of each party location, in order to attenuate the “political knowl-
edge” bias and the “projection effect” bias, I use a sampling procedure. I select samples
in which the distributions of vote choice and political knowledge are constrained. For each
of the samples, I select (with repetition) supporters of each party and from each level of
political knowledge. For example if the survey has four levels of political knowledge and the
country has three parties (A,B, and C), A and B being large parties and C a small party,
I select the following sample (two respondents in each category for large parties and one for
small parties):
5This is because party A is mainly ambiguous on a dimension that is orthogonal to the segment
party A voter 1, not to segment party A voter 1.
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Table 1: Sample Selection
political supporter of:
knowledge party A party B party C
1 2 2 1
2 2 2 1
3 2 2 1
4 2 2 1
As a result, the distribution of political knowledge is the same across supporters of
different parties, and the share of supporters from each party is more uniform than in the
whole sample. I select 100 samples based on these criteria. This sampling procedure should
allow to attenuate the biases described above. Using each sample I estimate the ambiguity
for each voter-party dyad (not only for the voters selected in the sample but for all voters).
I obtain 100 measures of ambiguity for each voter-party dyad and take the mean of these
100 measures. Figure 4 shows the distribution of ambiguity for all voter-party dyads in all
eight countries.
Figure 4: Ambiguity
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Van der Eijk (2001) proposes a measure of agreement (or disagreement if we reverse the
scale) concerning where a party stands on a given issue. Although our measure of ambiguity
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and the agreement measure are conceptually distinct, both are measures of ambiguity broadly
defined. I compare the two measures in the Appendix6 and show that, as expected, agreement
is negatively related to ambiguity.
4 Results
According to hypothesis 1, ambiguity should have a negative effect on party sympathy. The
analysis below regresses party sympathy on ambiguity to test this hypothesis. The unit of
observation is the voter-party dyad. The dependent variable is a measure of party sympathy
ranging from 0 (dislike) to 10 (like).7 One may wonder whether testing the effect of ambiguity
on vote choice would not be more relevant. Ambiguity however is generally higher among
catch-all parties, and catch-all parties are more likely to benefit from strategic voting. I
argue that the priority here is to better understand the effect of ambiguity on individual
preferences and thus decide to use party sympathy as the dependent variable.
Nevertheless, as the aim of the paper is to understand the effect of ambiguity on voters’
preferences, I only include respondents who voted in the analysis.8 The independent variable
of interest is ambiguity. Following a Downsian approach, I include a measure of perceived
distance and expect this variable to explain a large share of variability. The perceived distance
is the Euclidean distance between the voter’s perceived self location and the party location
as perceived by the voter. Ambiguity and perceived distance are the main variables of the
model. Both of these variables vary across individuals and across parties (i.e. voter-party
dyad).
In addition, some control variables generally included in analyses explaining vote choice
are also relevant here. Party sympathy might differ for parties represented in government as
the latter might benefit from high visibility. Consequently, I include a dichotomous variable
party in government. Single issue parties might also have higher levels of party sympathy.
Consequently, I include a dichotomous variable single issue party equal to 1 if the party is
considered as a single issue party and 0 otherwise.9 I also add the demographic variables age,
female, and education.10 Finally, I include random effects: one at the country level to control
for differences across countries (and surveys), and one at the individual level because some
individuals may have a higher general sympathy for political parties than others. Table
2 displays the results. In Model 1, I only include the main dependent variable perceived
distance, and the variable of interest ambiguity. In Model 2, I add the variables party in
government and single issue party. In Model 3, I add the demographic variables age, female,
and education.
6I use Ecker’s (2011) STATA package agrm.
7The levels of the scale vary across countries but all variables have been rescaled in order to have the
same minimum and maximum values. See the Appendix for the question used in each country.
8Results show similar trends in analyses comprising all respondents. I also tested whether ambiguity
interacts with turnout. Although I find that voters are more likely to dislike ambiguity than non-voters, this
result is not robust. A jacknife test shows that the results only hold in half of the cases.
9I follow Somer-Topcu (2015) and use the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset to code this variable.
If the percentage of the manifesto dedicated to left-right issues was higher than 42.27 (the mean minus a
standard deviation), I coded the party as single issue.
10The variable education has been standardized to range from 0 to 10 in each country.
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Table 2: The Effect of Ambiguity on Party Sympathy
Level Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
dyad intercept 8.209∗∗∗ 8.015∗∗∗ 8.045∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.229) (0.236)
perceived distance −0.473∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ambiguity −0.721∗∗∗ −0.801∗∗∗ −0.819∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.048) (0.049)
party party in government 0.543∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024)
single issue party 0.918∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049)
respondent age −0.002∗∗
(0.001)
female 0.131∗∗∗
(0.025)
education 0.010∗
(0.004)
Log Likelihood -120475.651 -119340.759 -115653.053
N 51110 50830 49274
Var: individual 0.314 0.340 0.339
Var: country 0.308 0.374 0.378
Var: Residual 6.238 6.096 6.084
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The results show that the perceived distance always has a negative effect on party sym-
pathy, consistent with the Downsian theory of voting. Ambiguity has a negative effect on
party sympathy and this across all three Models. This result confirms hypothesis 1 and is
consistent with the literature on decision theory, where scholars find that individuals gener-
ally do not like outcomes with too uncertain payoffs. This is a somewhat reassuring result
as it suggests that parties cannot indefinitely increase ambiguity to attract voters.
In Model 2, where party-level variables are included, it is interesting to see that voters
seem to have higher sympathy for single issue parties, and also for parties in government.
Finally, results in Model 3 show that individual-level characteristics also affects party sym-
pathy. Women rate parties higher on a sympathy scale than men, party sympathy decreases
with age and increases with education. Given that projection effects can affect perceived
distances (see the discussion above), I also ran similar regressions with the distance (i.e. the
Euclidean distance between the voter’s perceived self location and the mean of the perceived
party positions) instead of the perceived distance. The results show similar trends (see Table
5 in the Appendix).
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4.1 Robustness Checks
As a robustness test, I applied a jackknife by country (i.e. iteratively dropping the obser-
vations of one country) and obtained similar results. This suggests that the results are not
driven by the data of one specific country.
On can also wonder about potential multicollinearity between ambiguity and the per-
ceived distance. The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two variables equals 0.40.
The VIF (variation inflation factor) for perceived distance equals 1.23, 1.24,and 1.24 respec-
tively in Models 1 to 3. For ambiguity, the VIF is 1.23, 1.26, and 1.27 respectively in Models
1 to 3. Although there is no clear threshold allowing to decide whether or not multicollinear-
ity is a “problem” (Wooldridge, 2008, p. 99), these numbers are not alarming and I thus
assume that multicollinearity is not a concern here.11
However, a possible positive effect of party ambiguity is that parties can seem closer to
voters than they really are (Somer-Topcu, 2015). I thus test the effect of ambiguity on the
perceived distance by controlling for the distance (i.e. the objective distance) in the next
section.
5 Ambiguity and the Perceived Distance
I run a model relatively similar to Somer-Topcu’s (2015) analysis of the individual-level
mechanism. The unit of observation is the voter-party dyad and the dependent variable is
the perceived distance. The main independent variable is ambiguity. As control variables,
I include variables likely to affect voters’ perception: education, party in government, party
size, and single issue party. I include a country level effect and an individual level effect. If
ambiguity tends to decrease the perceived distance, we should see a negative coefficient for
the variable ambiguity.
11I also regressed party sympathy on perceived distance and then regressed the residuals of this regression
on all other dependent variables including ambiguity. I do so for Models 1 to 3 and also find a significant
and negative effect of ambiguity.
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Table 3: Explaining the Perceived Distance
DV = perceived distance
dyad intercept 1.187∗∗∗
(0.131)
distance 0.944∗∗∗
(0.004)
ambiguity −0.449∗∗∗
(0.037)
voter education 0.030∗∗∗
(0.003)
party party in government −0.038∗
(0.018)
single issue party 0.026
(0.029)
party size −0.652∗∗∗
(0.075)
Log Likelihood -117117.050
N 58031
Var: individual 0.752
Var: country 0.109
Var: residual 2.798
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3 displays the results of the regression. Consistent with the literature, the results
of Table 3 show that voters perceive a party as ideologically closer if the party is ambiguous.
The main explaining variable however is the distance. The effect equals almost one, which is
coherent as both distances are measured on the same policy space. Ambiguity ranges from
0.46 to 3.55, with a standard deviation of 0.44. This means that when ambiguity increases
by one standard deviation, the perceived distance should decrease by approximately 0.20
unit (perceived distances range from 0 to 18.84 with a standard deviation of 2.85).
This result suggests that ambiguity affects how close a voter thinks the party is from
him. This might seem to contradict results from Table 2 where the perceived distance is an
intervening variable. According to the results in Table 2, perceived distance has a negative
effect on party sympathy, and ambiguity has a negative effect on party sympathy. However,
according to the results in Table 3, the fact that ambiguity decreases the perceived distance
suggests that ambiguity has a positive effect on party sympathy, through the perceived
distance. Ambiguity seems thus to have a negative direct effect on preferences, and an
indirect positive effect through the perceived distance.
In the next section, I investigate further the mechanisms underlying the effect of ambi-
guity on party sympathy.
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6 Additional Analysis
The aim here is to understand whether some voters are more attracted to ambiguous parties
than others. More specifically, I test whether interest in politics affects the effect of ambiguity
on party sympathy (hypothesis 2 ). To test this hypothesis, I add the variable interest in
politics and its interaction with ambiguity to the variables of Model 3 in Table 2, inclusive
of the random effects. As curiosity increases with knowledge (Loewenstein, 1994), I also
control for political knowledge. Respondents who did not vote are not included. The variable
interest in politics ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means no interest and 1 means high interest
in politics. Table 4 presents the results.
Table 4: Ambiguity and Individual Preferences
Levels Independent Variable DV = Party Sympathy
dyad intercept 7.292∗∗∗
(0.279)
perceived distance −0.471∗∗∗
(0.005)
ambiguity −0.471∗∗∗
(0.082)
ambiguity × interest in politics −0.645∗∗∗
(0.115)
voter age −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
female 0.149∗∗∗
(0.026)
education 0.004
(0.004)
interest in politics 1.480∗∗∗
(0.195)
political knowledge −0.001
(0.005)
party party in government 0.547∗∗∗
(0.025)
single issue party 0.928∗∗∗
(0.051)
Log Likelihood -112793.584
N 48061
Var: individual 0.330
Var: country 0.447
Var: Residual 6.087
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The results show that interest in politics increases party sympathy, and the higher the
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interest, the more negative the effect of ambiguity on party sympathy is.12 Thus, the results
provide support for hypothesis 2. This finding is particularly interesting if the general level
of interest in politics can vary over time and across context. If the level of political interest
can increase from one election to the next, the effect of party ambiguity can also change.
Some parties may have an incentive in generating interest in politics, while others may not.
7 Discussion
In this paper, I develop a measure of ambiguity based on a spatial representation of the
policy space in eight European Democracies. This measure estimates the extent to which
the ideological distance between a voter and a party is ambiguous. It varies across each
voter-party dyad. One advantage of this measure of ambiguity is that it takes multiple
policy issues into account. This is important as parties can be more ambiguous on some
dimensions and less on others. Moreover, I use a sampling technique to attenuate potential
bias due projection effect in the estimation of ambiguity.
I test the effect of ambiguity on party preferences and find that ambiguity has a direct
negative effect on party sympathy. This is so despite the fact that ambiguity decreases
the perceived distance between the voter and the party. The results thus reconcile with
the literature in decision theory, and suggest that ambiguity can disadvantage parties. In a
normative perspective, given that ambiguity hampers the democratic representation process,
the results are encouraging. However, the fact that ambiguity tends to decrease the perceived
distance between a voter and a party may explain to a certain extent, the success of catch-all
parties.
In addition, I find that ambiguous parties have higher sympathy among voters with low
interest in politics. This result thus also stresses the importance of political communication
and in particular, the role of political actors and media in keeping democracy working.
Arousing interest in politics is vital for the quality of political representation and should
lead voters to be less tolerant towards ambiguity.
The results thus suggest that when interest in politics is high, individuals will be more
likely to avoid ambiguous parties. When interest in politics is low, individuals will be more
likely to focus on non-policy issues, and ambiguity will allow them to see the party closer than
it really is. In future work, exploring this individual-level mechanism may be worthwhile.
It is important to acknowledge that the present analysis has some limitations. First,
the measure focuses on a few political issues, and because these questions have been asked
in the election study specific to each country, it is assumed here that these issues are the
main political issues in the country. Second, this new measure of ambiguity assumes that
individuals know how other voters perceive each political party. Third, the analysis here
focuses on party sympathy as the main dependent variable. It may be interesting to test
the effect of ambiguity on vote choice. Especially, as catch-all parties are generally more
ambiguous and as they often benefit from strategic voting, it may be interesting to test how
party ambiguity affects the decision to vote tactically. This can be an interesting avenue for
future work.
12I also applied a jacknife here and the results are similar with one exception. After removing Denmark
the interaction effect is still negative but not significant at the 5% level.
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Appendix
Main Analysis: Controlling for the (Objective) Distance Instead of
the Perceived Distance
Table 5: The Effect of Ambiguity on Party Sympathy using (objective) distance
Level Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
dyad intercept 6.943∗∗∗ 6.585∗∗∗ 6.705∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.153) (0.161)
distance (objective) −0.465∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ambiguity −0.131∗∗ −0.119∗ −0.122∗
(0.049) (0.051) (0.052)
party party in government 0.705∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
single issue party 0.857∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044)
voter age −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
female 0.127∗∗∗
(0.022)
education −0.005
(0.004)
Log Likelihood -158220.406 -155448.711 -150855.777
N 65446 64661 62766
Var: individual 0.035 0.102 0.108
Var: country 0.104 0.144 0.148
Var: residual 7.328 7.067 7.050
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Comparison of our Measure with van der Eijk’s (2001) measure of
agreement
Here I compare our measure of ambiguity with van der Eijk’s (2001) measure of agreement. It
is important to note that ambiguity and agreement (or disagreement if we reverse the scale)
measure two distinct concepts. Ambiguity measures the perceived ambiguity of a party at
the individual level. Agreement measures the level of consensus among voters concerning
where the party stands, and is thus a measure at the party level. However, both should be
related.
I compare the two measures at the party level. To measure agreement, I use Ecker’s
(2011) STATA package and calculate the agreement score for each party on each policy
issue. I then take the mean across issues for each party. To have a measure of ambiguity at
the party level based on my measure, I take the mean across individuals. Figure 5 displays
the results. The straight line shows a simple linear regression of agreement on ambiguity.
The relation between the two measures should be negative as the level of agreement among
voter should decrease with ambiguity. This appears to be the case except for Belgium where
the relation is almost null. Of course the relation is far form being perfect but this is not
surprising as the scales are not directly comparable and the concepts differ.
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Figure 5: Comparing the Two Measures
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Variables Description
Austria
Data: Autnes pre and post panel study 2013 (November 2012 - July 2013).
Party Sympathy
• On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you like the political parties in Austria? Please
rate each party on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means you strongly dislike that party and
10 means that you strongly like that party. You can use the values in between to give
a more precise answer. How much do you like these parties?
Political Issues
• In politics people often talk about left and right. Where would you place X on a scale
from 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right. You can use the values in between
to give a more precise answer.
• Now, some questions about controversial political issues. Some people prefer low taxes
in exchange for few social benefits, while others prefer high taxes in exchange for
numerous social benefits. Where would you place X on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
means that you prefer low taxes in exchange for few social benefits, and 10 means high
taxes in exchange for numerous social benefits?
• Now, we turn to the issue of immigration. Some people say immigration to Austria
should be allowed only in exceptional cases, while other people say that immigration
to Austria should be openly regulated. Where would you place X on a scale from 0
to 10, where 0 means that immigration should be made possible only in exceptional
cases, while 10 means immigration to Austria should be openly regulated?
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• Generally speaking, are you very, fairly, a little or not at all interested in politics?
(very interested, fairly interested, a little interested, not at all interested, dont know,
refused)
Belgium
Data: 1995 General election study Belgium (October 1995).
Party Sympathy Here I coded party sympathy based on the following three questions:
• Which political party do you prefer most?
• Which political party do you prefer second most?
• Which political party do you prefer least?
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The constructed variable equals 3 if the party is the most preferred, 2 if it is the second, 0
if it is the least preferred, and 1 otherwise.
Political Issues
• People are sometimes classified to the degree in which they are Catholic or non-
Catholic. Someone who is very Catholic would mark the 0 and someone who is very
strongly non-Catholic would mark 10. Of course, there are intermediary positions to
the degree that one is more of less Catholic or non-Catholic. When you consider your
own ideas on this, where would you place X?
• About immigrants, and here we mean Turks and Moroccans, there are different con-
ceptions. Some think that they must receive the same rights as the Belgians, others
think that they should have fewer rights than the Belgians. Where would you place X
on a 0 to 10 scale?
• In politics, sometimes one has to choose between alternatives. Suppose that a choice
had to be made between “conservation/protection of the environment and “jobs. Where
would you place X on a 0 to 10 scale?
• Sometimes, too, one must choose between “the quality of life and “the preservation of
a high rate of economic growth. Where would you place X on a 0 to 10 scale?
Eight issues were available in this survey. However, I only selected four. The four remaining
issues (government regulations, freedom of speech, security vs. privacy, and regional vs.
national power) are not included in the analysis, to avoid having too many missing values.
The estimated party locations on the government regulations, the security vs. privacy, and
the regional vs. national power had more than 30% of “don’t know” answers. Moreover, in
the question on regional vs. national power, the wording differs for Flanders and Wallonia
(the regional power is called “Flanders” in Flanders and “the new identities” in Wallonia).
Finally, the question concerning freedom of speech is also excluded in order to limit the
number of missing values in the analysis. The four remaining questions are quite representa-
tive of the main political issues in Belgium (Boonen and Hooghe, 2012; Swyngedouw, 1992),
with the exception of the language-community cleavage. However, the party system is also
divided into the two languages and the variable party sympathy has only been asked for
Flemish parties to Flemish respondents, and for Walloon parties to Walloon respondents.
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• Some people are very interested in politics. Others are not interested at all. Are you
very interested in politics, or are you not at all interested? (very much, a lot, more or
less, little, none)
Denmark
Data: Danish National Election Study (September - December 2011).
Party Sympathy
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• Now I would like to hear what you think of the political parties. After I have mentioned
the party, I want you to place it on this scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you that
dislike the party very much and 10 means that you like it very much. If I mention a
party that you do not know or do not feel you know enough about, just say so.
Political Issues
• In politics one often talks about left and right. Where would you place X on this scale?
• The parties disagree on how many refugees we can receive. Some think we receive far
too many. Others say we can easily take more refugees. Here is a scale. Where about
would you place X?
• The parties also disagree how large the public sector should be. Some parties say we
should cut public revenues and expenditures. Others say that we must face increasing
public revenues and expenditures. Here is a scale. Where about would you place X?
• One often talks about a green dimension on which some parties strongly emphasize
environmental protection, while others say that environmental protection is going too
far. Here is a scale. Where about would you place X?
In this survey, there were seven issues available. However, the three remaining issues (law
and order, taxes, equality) had approximately 50% missing values (respectively 51.1 %, 51.1
%, and 48.9%, excluding “don’t know” answers) for self locations. Consequently, I decided
not to include these issues in the analysis.
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• Would you say that you are very interested, somewhat interested, only slightly inter-
ested or not at all interested in politics? (Very interested, Somewhat interested, Only
slightly interested, Not at all interested, Don’t know, unannounced, Irrelevant)
Germany
Data: German longitudinal election study (23 September - 23 December 2013).
Party Sympathy
• And now some more precise questions about the political parties. What is your general
opinion of each of the political parties? Please use the scale from +5 to -5. +5 means
that you have a very positive view of the political party; -5 means that you have a very
negative view of the party. You can use the numbers in between to state your opinion
more precisely.
Political Issues
• In politics, people sometimes talk about left and right. Where would you place X on
a scale from 1 to 11 where 1 means the left and 11 means the right?
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• Some people want lower taxes, even if this means a reduction in the benefits offered
by the social state, others want more benefits offered by the social state, even if this
means an increase in taxation. What do you think is the opinion of X regarding this
issue? Please use this scale from 1 to 11.
• And now about immigration. Should immigration be facilitated or restricted? What
do you think is the opinion of X regarding this issue? Please use this scale from 1 to
11.
• Some say that the fight against climate change should definitely take precedence, even
if it impairs economic growth. Others say that the economic growth should definitely
take precedence, even if it impairs the fight against climate change. What do you think
is the opinion of X regarding this issue?
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• In general terms: How interested in politics are you? Very interested, fairly interested,
moderately, not very interested or not interested at all?
Ireland
Data: Irish National Election Study (May 2002).
Party Sympathy
• The feeling thermometer works like this: If you have a favourable feeling (a warm
feeling) towards a politician you should place him/her somewhere between 50 and
100 degrees; if you have an unfavourable feeling (a cold feeling) towards a politician,
you should place him/her somewhere between 0 and 50 degrees; and if you don’t feel
particularly warm or cold (have no feeling towards the politician at all) then you should
place him/her at 50 degrees.
Where would you place each of the following political parties?
Political Issues
• In Politics people sometimes talk of left and right. And where would you place X on
a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? Please tick one
box.
• And now I would like to ask you a question about abortion. People who fully agree
that there should be a total ban on abortion in Ireland would give a score of 0. People
who fully agree that abortion should be freely available in Ireland to any woman who
wants to have one would give a score of 10. Other people would place themselves in
between these two views. Where would you place X on this scale? [Int. Show Card
C8].
• I would like you to look at the scale from 0 to 10 on this card. A 0 means government
should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and 10 means
government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social
services. Where would you place X on this scale?
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• With regard to the Northern Ireland problem some people think we should insist on a
United Ireland now while other people think we should abandon the aim of a United
Ireland altogether. Of course other people have opinions somewhere between these
extremes. Suppose the people who believe that we should insist on a United Ireland
now are at one end of the scale, at 0, and the people who think we should abandon
the aim of a United Ireland altogether are at the other end, at 10. Where would you
place X on this scale?
This survey had not four but six issues on which respondents were asked to locate themselves
and the parties. Two questions however (on European integration and the environment) had
more than 50% of answers missing for parties (respectively 50.3% and 50.4%, excluding the
”don’t know” answers).
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• How interested would you say you are in politics? (very/quite/not very/not at all)
Netherlands
Data: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (September - October 2012).
Party Sympathy
• Next, I would like to know from you how sympathetic you find the political parties.
You can give each party a score between 0 and 10. 0 means that you find this party
not sympathetic and 10 means that you find this party very sympathetic. If you don’t
know a political party, please feel free to say so. What score would you give party X?
Political Issues
• In politics people sometimes talk about left and right. Would you please indicate the
degree to which you think that a party is left or right? If you dont know a party, please
feel free to say so. Where would you place the CDA?
• Some people and parties think that the European unification should go further. Others
think that the European unification has already gone too far. Where would you place
the CDA on a line from 1 to 7, where 1 means that the European unification should
go even further and 7 that the unification has already gone too far?
• Some people think that the differences in incomes in our country should be increased.
Others think that they should be decreased. How would you place the CDA on a line
from 1 to 7, where 1 means differences in income should be increased and 7 means that
differences in income should be decreased?
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• Are you very interested in political topics; fairly interested; or not interested?
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Switzerland
Data: Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) 2007 (22 October - 5 November).
Party Sympathy
• Now we would like to know what you think about the main political parties. Tell us
please to which extend do you like party X by using the 0 to 10 scale. 0 means that
you really dont like the party and 10 means that you really like it.
Political Issues
• In politics, people often talk about the left and the right. Could you please tell me
where you would place X on a scale going from 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10
means right?
• Are you in favor of Switzerland joining the European Union, or in favor of an indepen-
dent path for Switzerland?
• Are you in favor of rising the taxes for high income, or would you rather lower the
taxes for people with high income?
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• In general, how interested in politics are you? Are you very interested, rather inter-
ested, rather not interested, or not interested at all?
UK
Data: British Election Study (January - September 2010).
Party Sympathy
• On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly
like, how do you feel about the Labour Party?
Political Issues
• Now, another issue. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0
means that government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social
services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and
spend much more on health and social services, where would you place X on this scale?
• Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of
people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of
accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime,
is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale, where would you place X
on this scale?
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• Now, using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that there
is no need for government to take action to improve opportunities for black and Asian
people, and the end marked 10 means that government should make every effort to
improve opportunities for black and Asian people, where would you place X on this
scale?
Variable Additional Analysis: Interest in Politics:
• Let’s talk for a few minutes about politics in general. How much interest do you
generally have in what is going on in politics? (a great deal, quite a lot, some, not very
much, none at all)
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